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COMMUNICATION STRUCTURES, INCENTIVE SYSTEMS AND
COORDINATED DECISION MAKING
ABSTRACT
Organizations are increasingly using information technologies
as a means for coordinating the independent decision making
activities of individual agents. Two important factors which
facilitate such coordination are organizational communication
pattern and the nature of incentives provided to individual agents.
In this paper, we investigate the effects on organizational
performance of different communication structures, under both
conflicting and nonconflicting incentive schemes. We report the
results of a laboratory experiment designed to test hypotheses based
on prescriptive design viewpoints espoused by Ackoff (1967) and
Rappaport (1968) against hypotheses based on game-theoretic and
decision-theoretic models. Student participants were paired into
dyads and assigned the role of either a purchasing or merchandising
manager. Participant teams were compensated based on one of two
incentive schemes (conflicting and nonconflicting) and given one of
three types of communication structures (no communication,
unidirectional communication, and bidirectional communication)
.
The results show that teams with communication performed
significantly better than those with no access, regardless of
incentives structure. For conflicting incentives, this is
consistent with the predictions of a game-theoretic model. For
nonconflicting incentives, this is inconsistent with the assumption
of perfect_rationality, but consistent with alternative views on
communication
.
The analyses indicated no significant differences in
performance between a simple, unidirectional communication
structure, and a bidirectional structure, where a series of messages
was sent between agents. Thus, for tasks such as the one examined
in this study, a rudimentary communication system may achieve
effective coordination of decision making. Also, learning effects
are stronger and more consistent under nonconflicting incentives
than under conflicting, indicating more effective coordination may
be possible with nonconflicting than with conflicting incentives.
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COMMUNICATION STRUCTURES, INCENTIVE SYSTEMS AND
COORDINATED DECISION MAKING
In today's organizational environments, decision issues are
increasingly modularized and distributed among individual managers
who must interact with each other to coordinate their independent
decision making. In many cases, these managers are located at
widely dispersed sites. Therefore, organizations are turning to
information technologies as a medium for coordinating their
activities in a distributed decision making environment. The
emergence of organizational environments with modularized tasks
has stimulated research on new principles of organization design
to facilitate the interaction of individual agents (Huber, 1984;
Huber and McDaniel, 1986; Malone 1987; Malone and Smith, 1988) .
In this research, a number of factors which expedite
effective coordination have been identified. Among these, the
organizational communication pattern is considered to be
particularly important. The structure of linkages between agents
(e.g., Malone 1987; Malone and Smith, 1988), as well as the manner
in which messages are distributed (Huber, 1982) are both posited
to have significant effects on organizational performance. A
second factor, which has received somewhat less emphasis, is the
nature of incentives provided to agents within the organization.
Huber and McDaniel (1986) indicate that decision units should be
rewarded for the quality of their decisions, but give only very
general guidance as to the types of reward systems that should be
implemented.
The prescriptive management information systems literature
also has addressed communication and incentives issues relevant to
the design of systems which are compatible with the structures and
processes of user organizations. A classic article by Ackoff
(19 67) gives advice on whether or not to allow communications
between decision makers, as well as on other design factors. In
particular, Ackoff indicates that restrictions should be placed on
communication between agents in order to enhance corporate
performance outcomes when agents are assigned to maximize
divergent goals. In a response to Ackoff, Rappaport (1967)
cautions that the degree of information access afforded agents may
not be the crux of the problem. Instead, Rappaport suggests that
organizational incentives need to be considered when designing
information systems, as well. He argues that full communication
between agents may be in the interest of an organization, if
corporate incentive schemes are "appropriate" and
"nonconflicting"
.
In this study, we investigate the effects on organizational
performance of allowing communication access between agents, under
both conflicting and nonconflicting incentives schemes. For
conflicting incentives, we develop and test a set of hypotheses
which posit that communication may be a beneficial coordination
mechanism, contrary to the viewpoint espoused by Ackoff (1967) .
The hypotheses are based on the assumption that individual agents
act strategically . That is, agents consider the results of both
their own actions and those of others in their environment when
making decisions. This viewpoint is consistent with the
assumptions of game-theoretic models, which have been applied to a
variety of problems in business, economics, and public policy
(e.g., Schotter and Schwodiauer, 1980; Ponssard, 1981; Shubik,
1982) .
For nonconflicting incentives, we test Rappaport s viewpoint
that communication will facilitate coordination of agents'
activities when they have "appropriate" measures of performance.
We also test a competing hypothesis which assumes that agents will
approach the nonconflicting incentives scenario as a joint
expected value maximization problem, where communication is not
necessary to achieve an optimal solution.
In addition, we investigate the effects on performance of
different types of communication structures, both under
conflicting and nonconflicting incentives. This is done by
comparing a simple communication structure, where a single message
between agents is allowed, to a more complex one where multiple
messages are allowed prior to agents' making a decision. We
tested the propositions regarding communication in a simulated
retailing environment similar to the one described by Ackoff
(1967) , in which participants assumed the role of merchandising or
purchasing managers.
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES
Conflicting Incentives: The Ackoff Scenario
In his article, "Management Misinformation Systems", Ackoff
(1967) described a retailing organization in which an information
system provided full access to data and complete communication
between two managers (merchandising and purchasing) . The
merchandising manager was evaluated based on gross sales; the
purchasing manager was evaluated based on inventory turnover.
Merchandising set the firm's selling prices, while purchasing
determined order quantities. Merchandising made selling price
decisions and order quantity requests based on optimistic
estimates of sales demand. On the other hand, purchasing would
consistently order less than merchandising had requested, not
wanting to be penalized for poor inventory turnover. Upon
learning of purchasing's actions, merchandising then would raise
its selling price, after which purchasing would again lower its
order quantity. According to Ackoff, this cycle of actions would
continue if left unchecked, resulting in progressively
deteriorating performance for the organization as a whole. His
proposed solution is to stop all communication between the two
managers and force them to "guess what the other was doing." His
specific example is reproduced in Appendix A.
Conflicting Incentives: A Strategic Viewpoint
A fundamental problem with the Ackoff scenario is that the
managers apparently ignore the effects their own actions would
have on subsequent actions of the other manager. This is
inconsistent with a strategic, or game -theoretic view of the
world. We show here that the managers in Ackoff's scenario should
be better off with communication than without, if they act in a
strategic fashion.
First, consider the case where the managers must "guess what
the other is doing", as Ackoff recommends. Figure 1 represents
this case as a game in extensive form . The diagram is drawn as if
merchandising first makes a price decision, purchasing makes a
quantity decision, then a random market outcome occurs. However,
the oval around the purchasing manager's nodes on the game tree
indicates that purchasing's information set at the time he makes
an order quantity decision does not include the selling price set
by merchandising. Therefore, the game operates as if both
managers were making their decisions simultaneously. The problem
facing the managers is to determine a pair of actions such that
neither individual, assuming the other is committed to their
choice, can increase their payoff by unilaterally changing
strategies. This pair of actions yields an equilibrium point
(e.g., Shubik, 1982, p. 240).
A version of the Ackoff scenario with communication is shown
in Figure 2. Here, the merchandising manager first chooses a
price, which is communicated to purchasing. Then, purchasing
chooses an order quantity, after which a random state of nature is
realized. Merchandising knows that for a given selling price,
purchasing will choose the order quantity that yields the highest
expected value of inventory turnover. Therefore, merchandising
must choose the selling price that yields the highest expected
value of gross sales, in anticipation of purchasing's actions.
This pair of actions is an equilibrium point for the scenario with
communication. Even if one allows the managers to communicate
price and quantity information back and forth several times before
a state realization occurs, as occurs in Ackoff's example, it is
still only the final price and quantity decisions that affect the
payoffs to the two managers. Therefore, the complete Ackoff
scenario can be modelled using a game tree such as that in
Figure 2
.
Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here.
Appendix B gives a numeric example for the Ackoff scenario
which shows that the expected payoffs to both managers are greater
when communication is allowed than when it is suppressed. Also,
Appendix B uses a game theory result by Dubey and Shubik (1981) to
show how in most cases, both managers will be better off with
communication than without.
Another case to consider is what occurs when the Ackoff
scenario is played out over a series of repeated trials. The
game-theoretic analysis outlined here thus far presumes a single-
period setting. However, players in a repeated noncooperative
game may achieve outcomes which are Pareto improvements over
single-period equilibrium outcomes through cooperation. They may
play as if they were playing a cooperative, or bargaining game,
since if one player "defects" from a cooperative solution, the
other can "punish" him by changing strategies on the next round
(Luce and Raiffa, 1957; Friedman, 1977) . Therefore, it is
possible that even pairs of managers with limited communication
may achieve Pareto-optimal outcomes by coordinating their actions
over time. However, it is still likely that pairs with
communication will be better off than those without since the
noncooperative "starting point" with communication yields higher
expected payoffs for both managers than without.
Conflicting Incentives: Hypotheses
Based on the above discussion, there are two divergent
hypotheses concerning performance under conflicting incentives
when communication is and is not allowed.
Hia (Ackoff) : With conflicting incentives, performance
outcomes will be less for dyads with communication than
without
.
Hib (Strategic) : With conflicting incentives, performance
outcomes will be greater for dyads with communication
than without
.
Nonconflicting Incentives
As stated in the introduction, Rappaport (1968) suggests that
communication between agents may be beneficial, if corporate
incentive schemes are "appropriate" and "nonconflicting".
However, he does not specify the "nonconflicting" incentives he
had in mind. For purposes of this study, we operationalize a
"nonconflicting" incentives scheme as an equal division of gross
margin less inventory holding costs. The nonconflicting scheme is
described more fully in Appendix C.
As shown in Appendix C, compensation for the two agents has a
unique maximum. From a decision-theoretic viewpoint, communica-
tion should not be necessary for the agents to jointly select the
price and quantity that will yield maximum compensation, if both
are expected value maximizers (i.e., are risk-neutral) . Even if
one or both of the agents is not risk-neutral, outcome feedback
from each trial conveys information about preferences. Therefore,
they should be able to infer each others' risk preferences after a
series of trials.
On the other hand, there may be limits to agents' abilities
to infer each others' preferences. Not only is this a difficult
problem to begin with, but it may be further complicated by
individual preferences which are not stable across time. It seems
reasonable to expect that allowing communication between agents
under nonconflicting incentives may provide additional information
that will assist them in overcoming their cognitive limitations.
Indeed, March and Simon (1958, Ch. 6) indicate that communication
between agents is one means by which organizations serve to
mitigate the effects of individual agents' bounded rationality.
Rappaport (1968) does not explicitly mention this idea, but his
assertions regarding communication as an aid to the decision maker
are consistent with March and Simon's ideas.
Hypotheses concerning the effects of communication on
performance under nonconflicting incentives are as follows.
H2A (Rappaport) : With nonconflicting incentives,
performance outcomes will be greater for dyads with
communication than without.
H2B (Joint EV Maximization) : With nonconflicting
incentives, there will be no difference in performance
outcomes for dyads with and without communication.
Degree of Communication
The prescriptive literature discussed above does not specify
the form or amount of communication afforded agents within an
information system. Ackoff describes a fairly rich communication
structure, with multiple messages between agents. On the other
hand, Rappaport ' s discussion of a nonconflicting incentives
setting indicates communication may be beneficial, without
indicating a precise communication structure.
The strategic analysis in this paper is quite specific about
communication structure under conflicting incentives. It shows
that a significant improvement in performance outcomes can be
achieved by allowing a single message to be sent from the
merchandising to the purchasing manager. Other messages could be
sent prior to the final price and quantity decisions, but the
predicted outcomes for such settings should be identical to the
game diagrammed in Figure 2. This is because outcomes for the two
managers depend only on the final price and quantity decisions.
As far as final outcomes are concerned, messages sent before the
final decisions are irrelevant.
There is a possibility, however, that allowing more than a
single message between agents may affect performance outcomes
.
This argument follows from bounded rationality considerations
similar to those discussed above. Specifically, the analysis in
Appendix B presumes risk-neutral agents. Like the nonconflicting
incentives case, if one or both of the agents are not risk-
neutral, they must infer each others 1 risk preferences over a
series of trials. On the other hand, allowing agents to
communicate their intended moves previous to taking final actions
conveys additional information about their preferences beyond that
contained in the outcome feedback from each trial of the game. In
particular, this communication structure gives both agents
information about each others' preferences during the course of
each trial, while the communication structure diagrammed in Figure
2 only gives the purchasing manager information about the
merchandising manager's preferences. In the rest of the paper, we
will refer to a communication structure which allows multiple
messages between agents as bidirectional f to distinguish it from
the unidirectional structure diagrammed in Figure 2.
H3 : With conflicting incentives, performance outcomes will
be greater for dyads with bidirectional communication
than with unidirectional communication.
Likewise, we can make a similar set of arguments about the
effects of bi- versus unidirectional communication with
nonconflicting incentives, as well.
H4 : With nonconflicting incentives, performance outcomes
will be greater for dyads with bidirectional
communication than with unidirectional communication.
METHOD
Experimental Task and Design
To test the above hypotheses, we conducted an experiment in
which student participants were randomly paired into dyads and
assigned the role of either a merchandising or purchasing manager.
Participants' incentive schemes were either conflicting, as in the
Ackoff example, or nonconf licting, as suggested by Rappaport
.
Under the conflicting scheme, merchandising managers were
compensated for the gross margin earned during each period of the
experiment. Compensation for purchasing managers was based on
inventory turnover. The conflicting compensation scheme was
operationalized using the parameters described in Appendix B. The
nonconflicting incentive scheme was an equal division of gross
margin less inventory holding costs. The nonconflicting scheme is
described more fully in Appendix C.
There were three types of communication structures within
each incentives condition: no, unidirectional, and bidirectional
communication. With no communication, the managers made their
decisions simultaneously. (See Figure 3.) Participants did,
however, learn the other manager's decision after the state
outcome for each period was realized. With unidirectional
communication, merchandising managers made a price decision and
transmitted it to the purchasing manager. The purchasing manager
then made a quantity decision. With bidirectional communication,
merchandising managers made initial price (PI) and quantity (Ql)
decisions and transmitted Ql to the purchasing manager. The
purchasing manager then made an initial quantity (Q2) decision,
and transmitted this figure to the merchandising manager. The
merchandising manager made a revised price (P2) decision, which
was revealed to the purchasing manager, who then made a final
quantity (Q3) decision. In both partial and full access, the
merchandising manager received feedback on the final quantity
decision, once the outcomes for the period were realized.
Insert Figure 3 about here.
Experimental Procedure
The participants were students at a large midwestern
university. They were recruited from senior and graduate (MBA and
Ph.D.) level business classes. Participants were assigned to
experimental groups so that the proportion of each type of student
was approximately equal in each group. There were ten dyads in
each of the six experimental groups, for a total of 60 dyads or
10
120 participants. All participants completing a given session
were in the same experimental group. "Points" earned during the
experiment (the compensation measures described in Appendices B &
C) were converted into cash at the end of the experiment at the
rate of 10,000 points = 1 cash dollar. In addition, participants
were also paid a flat fee of $3.00 for completing a post-
experimental questionnaire. The incentives were designed so that
the average compensation for a two hour experimental session would
be approximately $15.00.
Participants completed the task on networked microcomputers,
using specialized software developed for the experiment. They
simulated 18 periods of operations, indicating pricing or
purchasing decisions for each period. Market demand levels were
generated at random by the computer. These were displayed to the
participants at the end of each period along with the actions
taken by their partners and themselves, as well as other pertinent
data.
Experiment Software
The experiment software incorporates a display which allowed
participants to view data relevant to their decisions.
Participants used a mouse to access data. During each period of
an experiment, participants viewed one of four types of screens:
(1) analysis, (2) decision, (3) results, or (4) history.
The analysis screen allows access to data necessary to make
decisions in each period. At the beginning of the period, all
data on the screen is hidden from view. To access data, a
participant must select a display mode, an order quantity, and a
row or column from the display matrix by clicking the appropriate
boxes with the mouse (Figure 4)
.
Participants use the decision screens to enter prices and
order quantities (Figure 5) . These screens are also entirely
mouse-driven. The results screen appears at the end of every
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period (Figure 6) . This is a "passive" screen in that all data
are displayed; one need not use the mouse to view items on this
screen. After the first period, participants may use the history
screen to review the results of previous periods (Figure 7) . As
with the analysis screen, one must use the mouse to view data,
which is displayed either by period or by data type.
Insert Figures 4, 5, 6, and 7 about here.
RESULTS
Dependent Variables
In order to assess the affects of communication structure on
performance outcomes in the conflicting condition, we analyzed
three dependent variables: gross margin, inventory turnover, and
efficiency. Gross margin and inventory turnover are measures of
each individual agent's welfare under the various types of
communication access. They are calculated as discussed in
Appendix B. Efficiency (EFc) is a measure of the overall quality
of decision outcomes for each conflicting condition dyad. It is
defined as follows:
E (PERFC )
EFc " E(OPTc )
where
:
E(PERFc) = EV of (gross margin + (inventory turnover * 1000))
for actions actually taken during a period
E (OPTc) = Highest possible EV of (gross margin + (inventory
turnover * 1000) )
.
1
In the nonconflicting condition, we analyzed two dependent
variables: net compensation (e.g., gross margin less holding
costs, as defined in Appendix C) and efficiency. Both of these
are measures of the overall quality of decision outcomes for each
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nonconflicting condition dyad. Efficiency in the nonconflicting
condition (EFnc) is defined as follows:
.
E (PERFNc)
EFnc E(OPTNc)
where
:
E(PERFnc) = EV of (gross margin - inventory holding costs)
for actions actually taken during a period
E (OPTNc) = Highest possible EV of (gross margin - inventory
holding costs)
Tables 1 and 2 show the mean values of the dependent variables for
the nonconflicting and conflicting conditions.
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here.
Tests of Hypotheses
No communication versu s communication allowed :
Hia and Hib were tested by comparing the dependent variable
means for dyads with no communication to the average of the means
for dyads with unidirectional and bidirectional communication,
within the conflicting incentives condition. The multivariate
test of this contrast is highly significant (Wilks A, = 0.56;
F(3,25) = 6.67; p = 0.002). Univariate contrasts are
statistically significant for all three dependent variables (See
Table 3)
.
2 For all three variables, the means with communciation
are greater than without, consistent with Hib/ i.e., with the
predictions of the game-theoretic model.
Insert Table 3 about here
The multivariate test of H2a and H2b (no communication vs.
communication with nonconflicting incentives) is also highly
significant (Wilks X = 0.44; F(2,26) = 16.56; p < 0.001), as are
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the univariate tests of both nonconflicting condition dependent
variables (See Table 4) . Again, the partial and full
communication access means are greater than the no access means
for both dependent variables, consistent with H2a-
Insert Table 4 about here.
Comparisons of communication levels:
H3 and H4 were tested by comparing unidirectional and
bidirectional communication means within conflicting and
nonconflicting incentives. Neither of these contrasts were
statistically significant (conflicting: Wilks X = 0.93; F(3,25) =
0.63; p = 0.600; nonconflicting: Wilks X = 0.94; F(2,26) = 0.77; p
= 0.466)
.
Within-Subjects Analyses
The means of the dependent variables were computed across
blocks of trials to test for learning effects and the interaction
these effects might have with tests of individual hypotheses. The
overall main effect for trials is statistically significant in the
conflicting incentives condition (Wilks X = 0.46; F(6,22) = 4.34;
p = 0.005). 3 While the individual variables in the conflicting
condition tended to increase across time, tests of statistical
significance show varying results. Gross margin showed neither a
significant linear (F(l,27) = 2.78; p = 0.107) nor nonlinear
(F(l,27) = 2.92; p = 0.099) trend across time. Inventory turnover
showed a marginally significant increasing linear trend (F(l,27) =
3.89; p = 0.059) and a highly significant nonlinear trend (F(l,27)
= 7.04; p = 0.013). Analysis of the nonlinear trend for inventory
turnover shows a fairly large increase in mean inventory turnover
per period from the first to the second block of trials, with a
slight decrease from the second to the third block. Efficiency
showed a highly significant increasing linear trend (F(l,27) =
14
22.83; p = 0.000), but the nonlinear trend was not significant
(F(l,27) = 3.11; p = 0.089)
.
The overall main effect for trials is also statistically
significant in the nonconflicting incentives condition (Wilks A, =
0.43; F(4,24) = 8.07; p < 0.001). Here, tests for increasing
linear trends are highly significant for both net compensation
(F(l,27) = 30.78; p < 0.001) and efficiency (F(l,27) = 29.59; p <
0.001). Tests for nonlinear trends are not significant for either
of these variables (net compensation: F(l,27) = 1.11; p = 0.302;
efficiency: F(l,27) = 0.45; p = 0.509).
The only within-subjects interaction test which approaches
statistical significance is the test for the interaction between
trials and the test of H2A and H2B (Wilks X = 0.73; F(4,24) = 2.27;
p = 0.092) . The linear components of the interaction were not
significant, but the nonlinear components were significant
(F(l,27) = 6.51; p = 0.017 for gross margin, F(l,27) = 6.24; p =
0.019 for efficiency). Figure 8 is a diagram of this effect for
efficiency. Inspection of the diagram shows that only a slight
increase in performance occurred under full and partial access and
that most of the increase occurred from the first to the second
block of trials. On the other hand, the increase in performance
under no access was somewhat larger, but it did not occur until
after the third block of trials.
Insert Figure 8 about here.
Efficiency Data
The analysis of results thus far has shown that
communication had a significant positive effect on performance,
regardless of incentives. Given that these effects exist, another
issue for investigation is how performance under the various
communication conditions compares to normative efficiency
benchmarks. The nonconflicting incentives problem has a unique
15
maximum, so the benchmark in this condition is 1.0, regardless of
communication structure. With conflicting incentives, we define
the benchmarks as efficiency at the single-period equilibrium
point. The efficiency benchmarks are 0.681 for no communication
and 0.875 for unidirectional and bidirectional communication. 4
Insert Table 5 about here
95% confidence intervals were computed for the efficiency
measures for each level of communication access within each
communication condition. (See Table 5.) Within the nonconflict-
ing incentives condition, efficiency measures which are
significantly less than 1.0 indicate actions inconsistent with
coordination of actions for expected payoff maximization. None of
the confidence intervals for mean efficiency across all trials of
the experiment in the nonconflicting incentives condition include
the benchmark of 1.0. However, both the upper and lower
confidence limits for the last 6 trials are close to 1.0 with
unidirectional (0.963 - 0.994) and bidirectional (0.970 - 0.997)
communication. The confidence limit for no communication (0.804 -
0.970), however, is somewhat further away from 1.0. Consistent
with the within-sub jects tests, learning appears to have occurred
in all nonconflicting incentives conditions, but the dyads allowed
communication achieve near optimal performance, while those with
no communication do not.
In the conflicting incentives condition, efficiency measures
which are significantly greater than those associated with single-
period equilibria indicate that dyads may be achieving increased
performance through cooperation across time. Efficiency measures
which are significantly lower than those expected for single-
period equilibria indicate that dyad members are not acting in a
strategic fashion, as defined within the game-theoretic framework
outlined in Appendix B.
The lower limit of the 95% confidence interval for mean
efficiency across all trials of the experiment in the conflicting
incentives / no communication condition is greater than the
benchmark of 0.681 for all trials (0.692) and for the last six
trials (0.695). On the other hand, the benchmark of 0.875 for the
unidirectional communication condition is just barely inside the
upper limit of the confidence interval (0.876) for all trials.
However, the benchmark is well within the confidence interval for
the last six trials (0.838 - 0.907). With bidirectional
communication, the benchmark is well within the confidence limit
for all trials (0.825 - 0.898) and the last six trials (0.812 -
0.909)
.
Indications of Cooperative Behavior
The efficiency data for the conflicting incentives condition
indicate that cooperative behavior occurred in the no access
condition, but not in the full and partial access conditions.
However, efficiency measures which are greater than those expected
at single-period equilibrium points do not by themselves indicate
the presence of cooperation. This is because a 'cooperative'
outcome is by definition a Pareto-improvement over a single-period
equilibrium point. However, there are outcomes which represent
efficiency improvements over single-period (noncooperative)
equilibrium points, but do not represent Pareto-improvements over
these points. 5 Therefore, analyses of gross margin and inventory
turnover similar to the one for efficiency were performed in order
to assess whether payoffs to both types of agents under
conflicting incentives were consistent with those predicted by the
single-period game-theoretic analysis. (See Table 6.)
Insert Table 6 about here.
The mean gross margin for no communication across all trials
(13408) is greater than the expected single-period equilibrium
17
outcome of 12596, but the lower bound of the 95% confidence
interval (12581) is slightly less than the expected outcome. In
the last six periods, the mean gross margin is 13506 and the lower
bound of the 95% confidence interval is 12398. For mean inventory
turnover, the lower bounds of the 95% confidence interval are
greater than the noncooperative equilibrium expected outcome of
3.769 for all trials (4.002) and the last six trials (3.830)
.
Therefore, while the efficiency data indicate cooperation took
place in the no communication condition, only purchasing managers
achieved significant gains from cooperation, on average.
In the unidirectional and bidirectional communication
conditions, the mean gross margin for all trials (14267 and 14211,
respectively) is slightly greater than the predicted single period
equilibrium outcome of 14000, but the predicted outcome is above
the lower bounds of the 95% confidence intervals (1370 6 and
13728) . For the last six periods, the predicted equilbrium
outcome is still greater than the lower bounds for both
unidirectional (13739) and bidirectional (13308) access. The mean
inventory turnover values for unidirectional communication are
less than the single period equilibrium value of 7.000 for all
trials (6.019) and for the last six trials (6.404). Only for the
last six trials does the the 95% confidence interval (5.513 -
7.295) include the equilibrium value. With bidirectional
communication, the mean inventory turnover values are also less
than the noncooperative equilibrium value for all trials (6.403)
and the last six trials (6.206) . The predicted equilibrium value
of inventory turnover is within the 95% confidence interval for
all trials (5.706 - 7.100) and but is slightly outside the
confidence interval for the last six trials (5.438 - 6.974).
To summarize, merchandising managers in the conditions with
communication had performance outcomes on average that were as
high as would be expected by dyads choosing the single-period
(i.e., noncooperative) equilibrium point. On the other hand, the
mean compensation to purchasing managers with communication was
18
less than expected at the single-period equilibrium point.
Therefore, the results for the communication conditions are not
entirely consistent with the predictions of the game-theoretic
model. Even so, the average payoffs to both types of managers
with communication were significantly greater than without.
Selling Price and Order Quantity Data
Thus far, the presentation of results has focused on outcome
data. The Ackoff scenario, however, also makes certain
predictions about the prices and quantities chosen by the
managers. If Ackoff s predictions are true, we should see higher
selling prices and lower order quantities with communication than
without, at least with conflicting incentives. Also, selling
prices should increase and order quantities should decrease over
time
.
Table 7 shows mean selling price and order quantity data for
blocks of trials and for the entire experiment. Multivariate
tests on selling price and order quantity indicate significant
differences between dyads with no and some communication, in both
the conflicting (Wilks ' X = 0.76; F(2,26) = 4.20; p = 0.026) and
nonconflicting (Wilks' X = 0.59; F(2,26) = 8.97; p = 0.001)
incentives conditions. Univariate tests showed that dyads with
communication set significantly lower selling prices than those
without, in both the conflicting and nonconflicting incentives
conditions. (See Table 8.) Inventory order quantities were
significantly larger with communication than without, again for
both types of incentives. All these results are contrary to
Ackoff 's predictions. Multivariate tests showed no significant
differences between unidirectional and bidirectional communication
dyads, again in both the conflicting (Wilks' X = 0.92; F(2,26) =
1.14; p = 0.336) and nonconflicting (Wilks' X = 0.99; F(2,26) =
0.07; p = 0.937) incentives conditions.
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Insert Tables 7 & 8 about here.
Within-sub jects tests also show results contrary to Ackoff
s
predictions. The overall effect for trials only approaches
significance in the conflicting incentives condition (Wilks' X =
0.74; F(4,24) = 2.15; p = 0.106). Univariate tests do show a
significant downward linear trend across trials for selling price
(F(l,27) = 7.61; p = 0.010) and an upward linear trend for order
quantity (F(l,27) = 5.78; p = 0.023). The overall effect for
trials is highly significant in the nonconflicting incentives
condition (Wilks' X = 0.49; F(4,24) = 6.15; p = 0.001).
Univariate tests in nonconflicting incentives also show a
significant downward linear trend across trials for selling price
(F(l,27) = 15.96; p < 0.001) and an upward linear trend for order
quantity (F(l,27) = 16.86; p < 0.001).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper began by discussing contrasting views regarding
the effects of communication on agents ' performance in a
distributed decision making environment. For environments where
agents are assigned to maximize conflicting incentives, the
contrasting viewpoints were: (1) Ackoff s (1967) view that
communication between agents may be detrimental, and (2) a game-
theoretic analysis, which showed that in many cases, communication
is beneficial for pairs of managers with conflicting incentives.
For environments with nonconflicting incentives, we discussed: (1)
Rappaport's (1968) view that communication could be beneficial in
such a setting, and (2) a decision-theoretic analysis, which
indicated that communication access should not be necessary to
find the optimal solution to the nonconflicting incentives
problem. We also proposed hypotheses which indicate that not only
the existence of communication, but the type of communication
pattern may have an effect on performance outcomes.
The results of the experiment showed that dyads with
communication performed significantly better than those with no
communication, regardless of incentives. On the other hand,
varying the type of communication structure had no significant
effects on performance in either incentives condition. The
results with conflicting incentives are contrary to Ackoff's
views, but are consistent with the game-theoretic model. The
results with nonconflicting incentives support Rappaport's
viewpoint, that is, communication enhances performance with
nonconflicting incentives. This is contrary to the assumption of
perfectly rational agents who should be able to maximize their
joint outcomes without communication.
Comparison of efficiency measures against normative
benchmarks under conflicting incentives revealed that dyads with
no communication performed significantly better than predicted by
a noncooperative equilibrium model, but dyads with communication
on average only performed at least as well as predicted by the
model. Even so, both types of agents with communication still
earned significantly higher payoffs than their counterparts
without communication.
An analysis of performance across time showed that dyads with
nonconflicting incentives and communication were able to achieve
nearly optimal performance with experience. Even though
nonconflicting incentives dyads with no communication exhibited
stronger learning effects than those with partial or full access,
their performance in the last block of trials was still
significantly less than optimal. Also, most of the learning for
no communication dyads did not take place until the last block of
experimental trials. Learning effects also occurred with
conflicting incentives, but were not as pronounced as those for
nonconflicting incentives. Only inventory turnover and overall
efficiency showed statistically significant increases across time.
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From a prescriptive standpoint, it appears that . in an
environment where decision issues are modularized and distributed
among managers, communication is beneficial under both conflicting
and nonconflicting incentives systems. However, the results for
conflicting incentives are conditional on whether or not game-
theoretic equilibrium outcomes are predicted to be greater when
communication is allowed than when it is not. We did not make a
direct performance comparison between incentives conditions was
not made, since performance under different schemes is contingent
on the precise incentives chosen. However, the differential
learning effects observed under the two schemes suggest
nonconflicting incentives schemes are superior, as far as
coordination issues are concerned. Apparently, improvements in
performance under conflicting incentives are limited to the degree
individual agents are willing to cooperate. On the other hand, no
such limitation exists for nonconflicting incentives.
The lack of a significant difference between partial and full
access results indicates that only a fairly rudimentary
communication system is necessary in tasks such as the one
presented here. This result is particularly important in
situations where communication is costly, such as when operating
divisions are located in different areas around the world.
However, this finding is conditional on two factors. First, the
task used in the experiment was a fairly simple one, although
similar tasks are often found in practice. More complex tasks may
require the transmission of more extensive verbal and numeric
data,, or even social cues such as vocal inflection or facial
expression, to achieve optimal outcomes (Treviho, Lengel, and
Daft, 1987; McGuire, Kiesler, and Siegel, 1987) . Second,
substantial opportunities for learning existed in the experiment,
since the task was carried out over a number of repeated trials.
In a case where such learning opportunities do not exist, then
communication beyond a rudimentary level may be necessary.
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FOOTNOTES
inventory turnover is multiplied by 1,000 in these analyses
to make the gross margin and inventory turnover scales compatible.
For example, at the outcome p = 85 and q = 350 with conflicting
incentives, expected gross margin is 12250 and inventory turnover
is 7.000, making E (PERFC ) = 12250 + 7000 = 19250. The highest
possible outcome with conflicting incentives occurs at p = 75 and
q = 550, where E (PERFC ) = 13667 + 10333 = 24000. So, efficiency
for the outcome p = 85 and q = 350 is 19250/24000, or 0.802.
2Since the efficiency data are proportions, a variance-
stabilizing arcsin transformation was applied to them before
analysis (Neter and Wasserman, 1974, p. 507) .
3A multivariate repeated measures approach was used, as
described in Bock (1975, Ch. 7) .
Computations are as follows: no access—16364/24000; partial
and full access—21000/24000.
5For example, the outcome (p = 100, q = 400) yields an
efficiency measure of 0.72, which is greater than the no
communication EP efficiency of 0.68. However, the expected payoff
for the purchasing manager at this point is 2311, which is less
than the EP expected payoff of 3769.
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TABLE 1
Dependent Variable Means per Period
Conflicting Condition
Trials
1-6 7-12 13-18 Mean
Gross Marain
No Communication 12858 13859 13507 13408
Unidirectional 13803 14410 14588 14267
Bidirectional 14312 14332 13988 14211
Mean 13658 14200 14028 13962
Efficiency
No Communication 0.71 0.77 0.76 0.75
Unidirectional 0.81 0.85 0.87 0.84
Bidirectional 0.85 0.87 0.86 0.86
Mean 0.79 0.83 0.83 0.82
Inventory Turnover
No Communication 4.292 5.239 4.788 4.773
Unidirectional 5.256 6.398 6.404 6.019
Bidirectional 6.463 6.539 6.206 6.403
Mean 5.337 6.059 5.799 5.732
TABLE 2
Dependent Variable Means per Period
Nonconflicting Condition
Trials
1-6 7-12 13-18 Mear
Net Compensation
No Communication 6212 6316 7021 6516
Unidirectional 7218 7910 7623 7583
Bidirectional 7051 7620 7822 7498
Mean 6828 7282 7489 7199
Efficiency
No Communication 0.79 0.80 0.89 0.83
Unidirectional 0.92 0.97 0.98 0.96
Bidirectional 0.93 0.97 0.98 0.96
Mean 0.88 0.92 0.95 0.92
TABLE 3
Univariate Hypothesis Tests
Conflicting Incentives Condition
No Communication vs
(Unidirectional +
Bidirectional) /2
Unidirectional vs.
Bidirectional
Gross Margin Inv. Turnover Efficiency
E 2 E £ E E
5.74 .024 16.78 .000 19.17 .000
0.01 .889 0.90 .352 0.65 .428
TABLE 4
Univariate Hypothesis Tests
Nonconflicting Incentives Condition
No Communication vs
(Unidirectional +
Bidirectional) /2
Unidirectional vs.
Bidirectional
Compensation
-E E-
17.16
0.89
.000
.768
Efficiency
F a
30.51
0.07
.000
.794
TABLE 5
Confidence Intervals for Efficiency Measures
All 18 Periods Mean Std. Dev.
Conflicting Incentives
No Communication 0.747 0.078
Unidirectional 0.841 0.048
Bidirectional 0.862 0.051
Nonconflicting Incentives
No Communication 0.825 0.134
Unidirectional 0.958 0.022
Bidirectional 0.964 0.024
95% Conf. Interval
0.692 - 0.803
0.807 - 0.876
0.825 - 0.898
0.729 - 0.922
0.942 - 0.974
0.947 - 0.982
Periods 12-18
Conflicting Incentives
No Communication 0.765 0.097 0.695 - 0.834
Unidirectional 0.873 0.049 0.838 - 0.907
Bidirectional 0.860 0.068 0.812 - 0.909
Nonconflicting Incentives
No Communication 0.887 0.116 0.804 - 0.970
Unidirectional 0.978 0.021 0.963 - 0.994
Bidirectional 0.984 0.019 0.970 - 0.997
TABLE 6
Confidence Intervals for Gross Margin and Inventory
Turnover—Conflicting Condition
All 18 Periods Mean Std. Dev.
Gross Margin
No Communication 13408 1156
Unidirectional 14267 785
Bidirectional 14211 675
Inventory Turnover
No Communication 4.723 1.077
Unidirectional 6.019 0.595
Bidirectional 6.403 0.975
Periods 12-18
Gross Margin
No Communication 13507 1550
Unidirectional 14588 1186
Bidirectional 13988 951
Inventory Turnover
No Communication 4.788 1.338
Unidirectional 6.404 1.245
Bidirectional 6.206 1.074
95% Conf. Interval
12581 - 14234
13706 - 14828
13728 - 14693
4.002 - 5.544
5.594 - 6.445
5.706 - 7.100
12398 - 14616
13739 - 15436
13308 - 14669
3.830 - 5.745
5.513 - 7.295
5.438 - 6.974
TABLE 7
Means for Sales Price and Order Quantity
Across Blocks of Six Trials
Sales Price
Trials
1-6 7-12 13-18 Mean
Conflicting Incentives
No Communication 97.6 96.8 97.1 97.2
Unidirectional 96.1 93.0 91.6 93.6
Bidirectional 92.6 91.1 91.1 91.6
Mean 95.4 93.6 93.3 94.1
Nonconflicting Incentives
No Communication 98.5 97.6 95.5 97.2
Unidirectional 93.4 91.3 89.7 91.5
Bidirectional 93.5 92.0 90.0 91.8
Mean 95.1 93.6 91.7 93.5
Order Ouantity
Trials
1-6 7-12 13-18 Mean
Conflicting Incentives
No Communication 309.9 329.1 321.7 320.2
Unidirectional 336.7 360.8 372.6 356.7
Bidirectional 353.4 368.3 363.4 361.7
Mean 333.3 352.7 352.6 346.2
Nonconflicting Incentives
No Communication 365.8 350.0 385.0 366.9
Unidirectional 403.3 435.8 448.2 429.1
Bidirectional 397.7 425.7 445.9 423.1
Mean 388.9 403.8 426.4 406.4
TABLE 8
Univariate Tests— Selling Price and Order Quantity
Selling Order
Price Quantity
J2-
Conflictina Incentives
No Communication vs.
(Unidirectional +
Bidirectional) /2 8.68 .007 6.51 .017
Unidirectional vs.
Bidirectional 1.20 .283 0.08 .779
Nonconflictina Incentives
No Communication vs.
(Unidirectional +
Bidirectional) /2 13.32 .001 17.32 .000
Unidirectional vs.
Bidirectional 0.04 .836 0.13 .718
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Manager Manager
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APPENDIX A
Excerpts from Ackoff, R. L.,
"Management Misinformation Systems,"
Management Science
r
(December 1967), pp. B147-156
...For example, consider the following very much simplified version
of a situation I once ran into. The simplification of the case does
not affect any of its essential characteristics.
A department store has two "line" operations: buying and
selling. Each function is performed by a separate department. The
Purchasing Department primarily controls one variable: how much of
each item is bought. The Merchandising Department controls the
price at which it is sold. Typically, the measure of performance
applied to the Purchasing Department was the turnover rate of
inventory. The measure applied to the Merchandising Department was
gross sales; this department sought to maximize the number of items
sold times their price.
Now by examining a single item let us consider what happens in
this system. The merchandising manager, using his knowledge of
competition and consumption, set a price which he judged would
maximize gross sales. In doing so he utilized price-demand curves
for each type of item. For each price the curves show the expected
sales and values on an upper and lower confidence band as well.
(See Figure Al
.
) When instructing the Purchasing Department how
many items to make available, the merchandising manager quite
naturally used the value on the upper confidence curve. This
minimized the chances of his running short which if it occurred,
would hurt his performance. It also maximized the chances of being
overstocked but this was not his concern, only purchasing manager's.
Say, therefore, that the merchandising manager initially selected
price PI and requested that amount Ql be made available by the
Purchasing Department.
In this company the purchasing manager also had access to the
price-demand curves. He knew the merchandising manager always
ordered optimistically. Therefore, using the same curve he read
over from Ql to the upper limit and down to the expected value from
which he obtained Q2, the quantity he actually intended to make
available. He did not intend to pay for the merchandising manager's
optimism. If merchandising ran out of stock, it was not his worry.
Now the merchandising manager was informed about what the purchasing
manager had done so he adjusted his price to P2 . The purchasing
manager in turn was told that the merchandising manager had made
this readjustment so he planned to make only Q3 available. If this
process—made possible only by perfect communication between
departments—had been allowed to continue, nothing would have been
bought and nothing would have been sold. This outcome was avoided
by prohibiting communication between the two departments and forcing
each to guess what the other was doing.
Optimistic
Expected
Pessimistic
Fig Al Price-demand curve
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APPENDIX B
A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Ackoffs Scenario
Basic Parameters
Assume that sales demand (d) is jointly dependent on selling
price (p) and on a random state of nature. Nature has three
possible state realizations, which occur with equal probability.
They represent high, medium, and low sales demand. The demand
functions for each state are:
High demand: d = 2555 - 220 (p1/2 )
Medium demand: d = 2500 - 220 (p1/2 )
Low demand: d = 2445 - 220 (p1/2 )
If demand is greater than the quantity ordered by purchasing
(q) , the units sold for the period are equal to q, that is, no
backorders are allowed. If demand is less than the quantity ordered
by purchasing, the units sold for the period are equal to d.
Remaining units are not carried over to the next period; it is
assumed these are disposed of at cost. The cost for each item is
50, therefore, the gross margin for each period is:
(p - 50) x number of units sold
Merchandising ' s compensation for each period is one-half of
gross margin. Purchasing's compensation is based on a modified
version of the traditional inventory turnover ratio, specifically:
number of units sold
. «___,1000
ending inventory + 50
Merchandising may set a selling price anywhere from 75 to 120, in
increments of 5. Purchasing may order from 100 to 550 units, in
increments of 50." The expected values for each manager for each
combination of selling price and order quantity are shown in
Figure Bl
.
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Game-Theoretic Analysis: No Communication Allowed
If one were to show the extensive form of this game, the
diagram would look like Figure 1, except that it would have ten
branches coming out of merchandising' s initial decision node and
another ten branches coming off of these branches, at each of
purchasing's decision nodes. Figure Bl shows the strategic form of
the game. By successively eliminating dominated strategies
(starting with p = 120, q = 100, and so forth), one can show that
this game has a unique equilibrium point (EP) at p = 105, q = 250.
The expected payoffs at this point are 62 98 to merchandising and
3769 to purchasing.
Game-Theoretic Analysis: Communication Allowed
In the case where communication from merchandising to
purchasing is allowed, the game can be represented in extensive form
by a diagram similar to Figure 2. The actions which yield the
highest expected payoffs for merchandising in this game are p = 85
and p = 90. At p = 85, purchasing should choose q = 400, yielding
expected payoffs of 7000 for merchandising and 8000 for purchasing.
At p = 90, purchasing should choose q = 350, again yielding an
expected payoff of 7000 for merchandising, but only 8000 for
purchasing. Note that in either case, the expected payoffs to both
managers are higher than without communication.
The predicted outcomes for the game with communication,
however, are but two of many EPs. Also, note that the EP of the
game without communication is one of the EPs of the game with
communication. In fact, Dubey and Shubik (1981) have shown that for
two games which are identical, except for the information sets of
the players, the set of pure strategy EPs for the game with less
information will be a subset of the set of pure strategy EPs of the
game with more information.
In the Ackoff scenario, this means that the merchandising
manager will be at least as well off with communication as without.
His choice set of EPs with communication will always include the no
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communication EP (s) , and in many cases, will also include an EP
where the expected payoffs are greater than without communication.
This does not by itself guarantee an increased expected payoff with
communication for the purchasing manager. However, in cases where
the payoff structure is similar to the one shown here, the action
with the highest expected payoff for merchandising under
communication is to set a lower selling price than without
communication. Purchasing's best response to this is to order a
higher quantity than without communication. This will yield a
higher expected inventory turnover for purchasing than without
communication and therefore, higher expected payoffs.
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100 150 200 250
q
300 350 400 450 500 550
75 1250 1875 2500 3125 3750 4375 5000 5625 6250 6833
80 1500 2250 3000 3750 4500 5250 6000 6750 7385 7795
85 1750 2625 3500 4375 5250 6125 7000 7683 8103 8260
90 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 7720 8140 8260 8260
95 2250 3375 4500 5625 6750 7508 7928 8010 8010 8010
100 2500 3750 5000 6208 7042 7458 7500 7500 7500 7500
105 2750 4125 5418 6298 6756 6765 6765 6765 6765 6765
110 3000 4380 5310 5790 5790 5790 5790 5790 5790 5790
115 3098 4084 4583 4583 4583 4583 4583 4583 4583 4583
120 2625 3150 3150 3150 3150 3150 3150 3150 3150 3150
Expected Value of Payoffs for Merchandising Manager
(Gross Margin / 2)
100 150 200 250
q
300 350 400 450 500 550
75 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000 10333
80 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 8845 7567
85 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 7675 6396 4395
90 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 6630 5423 3529 2411
95 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 5680 4602 2868 2000 1547
p 100 2000 3000 4000 4818 4778 3860 2311 1636 1275 1046
105 2000 3000 3746 3769 3189 1851 1321 1033 850 723
110 2000 2742 2873 2475 1437 1030 807 665 566 492
115 1781 2048 1816 1058 758 593 488 415 361 320
120 1268 1222 702 499 388 318 270 234 207 186
Expected Value Payoffs for Purchasing Manager
(Inventory Turnover * 1000)
Figure Bl
Expected Values to Managers with Conflicting Incentives
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APPENDIX C
* The Nonconflicting Incentives Condition
The demand functions and game rules used in the nonconflicting
incentives condition are the same as with conflicting incentives,
with the exception of how the payoffs to the managers are defined.
Under nonconflicting incentives, each item remaining in ending
inventory is assumed to have a holding cost of ten units. Payoffs
are an equal division of gross margin less holding costs. Expected
payoffs for each combination of selling price and order quantity are
shown in Figure CI. By inspection, one can see that the highest
expected payoff, 7925, occurs at p = 90, q = 450.
100 150 200 250
q
300 350 400 450 500 550
75 1250 1875 2500 3125 3750 4375 5000 5625 6250 6817
80 1500 2250 3000 3750 4500 5250 6000 6750 7347 7643
85 1750 2625 3500 4375 5250 6125 7000 7628 7918 7870
90 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 7650 7925 7825 7575
95 2250 3375 4500 5625 6750 7426 7689 7540 7290 7040
100 2500 3750 5000 6200 6950 7200 7000 6750 6500 6250
105 2750 4125 5403 6193 6484 6245 5995 5745 5495 5245
110 3000 4360 5195 5505 5255 5005 4755 4505 4255 4005
115 3075 3963 4288 4038 3788 3538 3288 3038 2788 2538
120 2500 2850 2600 2350 2100 1850 1600 1350 1100 850
Figure CI
Expected Values: Nonconflciting Incentives
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